ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION

17
Metacognition -'cognition about cognition' -is typically characterized as involving two control strategies in order to regulate their cognitive activities. As an illustration, having 24 spent some time studying her lesson, a student may judge that she is still in trouble when 25 rehearsing it and may decide to continue studying, as a result.
26
Research has shown that a large part of metacognitive evaluation or monitoring can 27 take place outside conscious awareness, calling for a further distinction between implicit that System 1 metacognition is for the control of intra-personal cognitive activities while 44 System 2 metacognition, is for supra-personal cognitive control. In other words, System 2 45 metacognition has the computational resources of broadcasting intra-personal metacognitive 46 information to others and, therefore, allows for the regulation of group behaviour (e.g., to 47 coordinate sensorimotor activities between members of a group executing a common task). In 2010) -this is the "two-heads-better-than-one" effect (Bahrami et al., 2010; Koriat, 2012) .
53
Importantly, communication or sharing of confidence is necessary for such joint perceptual 54 decision benefits to occur even in the presence of external feedback about the accuracy of the 55 perceptual decision of both subjects of the dyad (conversely, the presence of external 56 feedback is not necessary when confidence is shared). The improving effect of informational 57 exchange between members of a team is not limited to perceptual discrimination and has 58 been shown to improve problem solving (Cooper & Kagel, 2005) 2012) To explore these questions we designed an auditory pitch discrimination task in which 111 participants had to decide which of two pure tones presented successively had the higher 112 pitch -a first-order decision -and to rate their confidence in their response -a second-113 order decision (Figure 1) . Pairs of participants were tested together. In one condition, 114 participants performed the task separately (Baseline condition, Figure 1A ); in another 115 condition, while one participant was performing the task, the other was observing her doing it 116 and had access to the stimuli (Full-Observation condition, Figure 1B ). In what follows the 117 term 'observer' denotes the participant observing the other participant performing the task, 118 whom we will call the 'agent. In the Full-Observation condition, the observer was to judge 
125
We hypothesised that participants would be able to judge the confidence of the agent 126 and that it would be easier for observers to judge agents' confidence in the Full-Observation 
RESULTS
147
Agent performance at the first-and second-order level
148
First, regarding the first-order task (i.e., pitch discrimination task), a repeated-measure
149
ANOVA showed no effect of condition on type 1 sensitivity (d') (F(1.10, 18.64) = 1.01, p > Second, with regards to the second-order task, we found no effect of condition on Observer ability to read agent confidence
173
Before comparing the relation between the observer and the agent confidence between the 174 different conditions, we checked whether this relation was significant within each condition.
175
For each condition, we fitted a linear mixed-effects model of the confidence of the observer,
176
with confidence of the agent as fixed effect and intercept for participants as random effect.
177
Results confirm that the observer was indeed capable of judging the confidence of the agent 
195
The second row estimates the regression slope between the confidence of the observer cannot be explained by differences stemming from the agent, as there was no difference in 213 sensitivity, criterion, confidence or response times for the agent between these two 214 conditions. In addition, it cannot be explained by differences in the confidence of the 215 observer as it did not differ significantly between these two conditions. 
243
The mediation analysis was performed with these two models (using the mediation package; corresponds to the same subject in the Baseline condition).
291
As expected, a one-way one sample t-test showed that the A ROC of participants 292 judging themselves in the Baseline condition were significantly higher than 0.5 (p < 10 -6 ). In 293 the Full-, Partial-and Self-Observation conditions the A ROC were also significantly higher 294 than 0.5 (Full-Observation condition: p < 10 -4 ; Partial-Observation condition: p < 0.01, Self-
295
Observation condition: p = 0.03), suggesting that the metacognitive ability of the observer 296 regarding the agent (or herself through video recording in the Self-Observation condition)
297
was also higher than chance.
298
Analysis of variance revealed a significant difference between conditions (F(2.35, 
DISCUSSION
315
In the current study we investigated the extent to which one can evaluate the confidence of 316 others in absence of verbal communication. We also asked whether one has a privileged 317 access in assessing confidence when performing the task directly compared to observing 318 someone else or when observing oneself compared to observing someone else. showed that participants were not simply able to track the confidence of someone else, they confidence.
347
The third important result is that there is no difference in accuracy in assessing condition they returned to their original role assignment.
431
In the Baseline condition ( Figure 1A ), participants were seated at a different desk and 432 performed the task on their own without seeing the other participant. During this condition,
433
they were both filmed so that their facial expression, body and hands were recorded. In the
434
Full-Observation condition ( Figure 1B ) participants joined at one desk. The observer seated 435 so that she had the same point of view as the camera in the baseline condition. The keypad on 436 which the agent gave her confidence ratings was hidden from the observer thanks to a 437 cardboard. Both the agent and the observer wore headphones and heard the auditory stimuli.
438
Once the agent gave her confidence in her response the observer had to judge what she The Baseline condition always took place first and the Self-Observation condition 453 always took place last so as to avoid any memory effect in the Self-Observation condition 454 and to ensure that all participants knew the task before judging the confidence of the agent in In order to compare the ability of the observer to assess the confidence of the agent as well as 477 her own confidence in the different conditions, we performed mixed models and mediation
478
analysis. In addition, metacognitive ability was estimated through the type-II area under the
479
Receiver Operating Curve (A ROC ), which plots the correct response rate against the incorrect 480 response rate at each confidence level (Kornbrot, 2006) . However here, except in the
481
Baseline condition, we use this measure in a nonconventional way, as we use the confidence 482 of the observer and the accuracy of the agent to compute these A ROC . This is what we further 483 refer to as the metacognitive ability of the observer regarding the agent.
484
In addition, we used within-subject repeated measures analysis of variance to test for 485 differences in first-and second-order performances followed by paired and one sample t-test 486 to determine the direction of differences. In all ANOVAs, degrees of freedom were corrected 487 using the Greenhouse-Geisser method. 
